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Judaism without Ordinary Law:  
Toward a Broader View 
of Sanctification
assertion: “[T]he elimination of the 
civil code from Jewish life has, in fact, 
administered as severe a blow to Juda-
ism as the destruction of the Jewish 
commonwealth”(Kaplan, 17).1 
The political emancipation of the 
Jew, beginning in France in 1791 and 
then spreading elsewhere, both gave 
and took. With the granting of full civil 
rights to Jews came the loss of much of 
Jewish law as a functioning legal system, 
since the secular legal system replaced 
the Jewish legal system for most ordi-
nary disputes. Functionally speaking, 
the basic law-in-practice as known by 
most Diaspora Jews, including Ameri-
can Jews, became the secular law.2 If a 
neighbor damages your property or a 
business partner breaches a contract, 
your must sue them in the civil court 
to recover. Whether the neighbor or 
the business partner is a fellow Jew 
is essentially irrelevant. The operative 
law and the legal system that will ad-
dress the dispute are secular ones. As a 
by-product of political emancipation, 
n the second chapter of Judaism 
as a Civilization, Rabbi Mordecai 
M. Kaplan makes a remarkable I Jewish law-in-function was essentially relegated to the ritual realm. This ap-plied not simply to progressive or liberal 
branches of Judaism, but to traditional 
ones, too. As Kaplan wrote, “[T]he 
most important elements of Jewish law 
are as obsolete in Neo-Orthodoxy as 
they are in Reformism.” We learn that 
Neo-Orthodoxy accepts with equanim-
ity the elimination of the whole civil 
code of Jewish law, and is content to 
confine the scope of Jewish law to ritual 
observance” (Kaplan, 157).3 
Differences in Gravity
Upon first reading Kaplan’s state-
ments, I reacted strongly. While I 
suspected some hyperbole (could the 
replacement of much operative Jewish 
law with civil law really compare to the 
destruction of the Jewish common-
wealth?),4 Kaplan’s words struck a deep 
chord. As one who is both a law profes-
sor — a professor of American law and 
legal practice — and a Jew, I know how 
different the functioning of civil law 
can feel from that of ritual law.
Let me give two examples. My wife 
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and I have had numerous discussions 
about  kashrut, addressing “legal” ques-
tions such as what level of hekhsher to 
require of foods, what to say to din-
ner guests who wish to bring a dish 
to our home and so on. By contrast, 
I recall when serving as a law clerk to 
an appellate judge discussing with that 
judge whether a defendant’s conviction 
should be overturned for evidentiary 
error, a decision that would determine 
whether that person would spend the 
next decade in prison. My wife and I 
consider our kashrut decisions care-
fully. We attempt to articulate general 
principles underlying our decisions 
rather than deciding cases ad hoc.  Yet, 
no matter how seriously we take them, 
the gravity of our kashrut decisions is 
simply of a different order of magni-
tude than a decision that determines 
whether a human being will remain 
incarcerated for much of his life.
As I pondered Kaplan’s words, my 
mind began turning his statements into 
questions. How has the relegation of 
Jewish law to the ritual realm affected 
the role of the rabbi? What does it 
mean that rabbis rarely serve as judges 
in real human disputes? How has this 
shift affected the lives of other Jews? 
For example, Jews wishing to work in 
the law-in-practice would have to un-
dertake a secular rather than a religious 
legal training. How would that affect 
their lives? And what of the Jewish 
wisdom and lore contained in now 
largely inoperative sections of Jewish 
legal texts like the Talmud?5  Would that 
rich knowledge also be lost as civil law 
replaced halakhah has operative law? 
Numerous important questions 
arise, far too many to address here. 
Rather, I shall confine myself to a single 
question: How has the restriction of 
operative Jewish law to the ritual realm 
influenced our understanding of sanc-
tification?  
Visions of Sanctification
In response, I will suggest that re-
stricting operative Jewish law to the 
ritual realm may have brought with 
it a narrowing of how we understand 
sanctification — a narrowing we should 
attempt to undo. Before explaining 
this, let me make a request by way of 
confession. Although I study Judaism 
seriously, I am not an expert in it. My 
primary expertise lies in American legal 
practice — specifically, in legal dispute 
resolution. That vantage point is of 
aid as I approach the question above, 
for it gives me an understanding of 
an ordinary functional legal system 
— that is, a legal system that exercises 
real power to resolve actual disputes. 
Yet as one not formally trained in 
either history or Jewish thought, it is 
with much humility that I approach 
the religious, historical question of how 
relegating operative Jewish law to the 
ritual realm may have influenced our 
understanding of sanctification. I ask 
that readers approach the statements 
below as hypotheses rather than as 
conclusions, and hope that, should they 
see fit, those versed in other fields will 
evaluate and, where appropriate, refute 
such speculations.
It may be helpful to begin by identify-
ing two different, though not unrelated, 
visions of sanctification (kedushah).  
The first vision is sanctification as 
separation from the ordinary, that 
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is, kodesh vs. hol. In the words of the 
Orthodox Union, “The basic mean-
ing [of kedushah] is separation from 
the ‘general’ and dedication to the 
particular” (http://www.ou.org/about/
judaism/jl.htm).This is the sense of 
holiness we usually have in mind when 
we think of Shabbat (as different from 
ordinary days), of kashrut (as dividing 
the kosher from the treif), and even of 
marriage (as  separating a couple from 
participating in sexual relations with all 
others through kedushin). Separation 
lies at the core of such fundamental 
Jewish ritual building blocks.  Further, 
much ritual effort is devoted to mark-
ing the lines of separation.  Candles are 
lit at the beginning and end of Shabbat. 
Much energy is devoted to kashering 
a kitchen when moving into a new 
home. The wedding process is usually 
marked by a sense of ceremony, often 
with many guests invited. 
The second vision is sanctification as 
elevating or improving. When we an-
nounce in the Kedushah, “Holy, Holy, 
Holy is the Lord of Hosts; the whole 
world is full of God’s glory,” it is not 
that we are seeing God as separate from 
our world. Rather, we are seeing God 
as permeating and elevating our world. 
Sanctification, in other words, can be 
viewed as a direction.  
Often, the first vision of sanctifica-
tion as separation and the second vi-
sion of sanctification as elevation exist 
simultaneously. Shabbat is a holy day 
not merely because it is a separate day, 
but because that separation is in the di-
rection of elevation toward greater joy, 
fulfillment and rest. Even the solemn 
Yom Kippur — the holiest of days — is 
ultimately oriented toward elevation 
(through teshuvah). Note, however, that 
this second vision of sanctification need 
not be tied to that of separation.  It is 
possible to improve or elevate some-
thing without separating from it.
Legal Implications
As mentioned, in the ritual realm, 
Jewish law centrally concerns itself 
with promoting sanctification through 
the process of separation. Jewish ritual 
law seeks to construct a world in which 
the holy is separated from the ordinary. 
Moreover, the fact that Jewish law 
provides the parameters of such ritual-
ized activity helps to authenticate the 
religious foundation of such activity. 
Part of what helps the ordinary Jew to 
feel holiness through such rituals is that 
Jewish law provides for these rituals.
By contrast, in the non-ritual realm, 
separation is not the hallmark of 
sanctification. Though analysis and 
classification are of course important 
to non-ritual Jewish law, separation 
per se is not especially so. If one’s ox 
gores a neighbor’s ox, the central legal 
issue is not whether an ox is or is not 
a kosher animal. Rather, as with most 
types of ordinary law, the central legal 
question is what remedy should ensue.5 
Ordinary Jewish law does not pursue 
the construction of binary categories. 
Yet this does not mean that there is no 
sanctification to be found. Quite the 
reverse. Often, for people in the midst 
of conflict, great sanctity is experienced 
when that conflict is resolved, whether 
by mutual agreement or by a legal 
award. The critical point is that such 
sanctification — as with much of the 
sanctification in our world — is to be 
.
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found not by separating off from ordi-
nary life, but by going through it. In-
deed, were a comparison to be made, I 
suspect that such sanctification through 
ordinary life “exceeds” sanctification 
vs. ordinary life in importance. What 
we do on the six days of the week ulti-
mately has more to say about whether 
we lead a sanctified life than what we 
do on Shabbat.  
We can now see a root problem that 
may have arisen with the restriction of 
operative Jewish law to the ritual realm. 
Both because the basic forms of sanc-
tification are different and because the 
imprimatur of Jewish legal authority no 
longer attaches to the ordinary realm, 
many Jews no longer recognize ordinary 
life as sacred, or at least as an activity 
that can be sanctified. For many Jews, 
the non-ritual realm has lost much of 
its religious significance.  
Perhaps an example will help convey 
this. Recently, I presented a  d’var torah 
to my havurah and shared the thesis of 
this essay. A mother responded with a 
story about her six-year-old daughter. 
Until this year, the girl had attended 
our community’s Jewish preschool, but 
had since switched to public school. 
After several weeks in public school, 
the daughter asked her mother (I 
paraphrase), “What does it mean to be 
Jewish in public school? Does being 
Jewish in public school mean keeping 
kosher and keeping Shabbat?” The 
girl’s questions focus upon ritual Jew-
ish life. In one sense, no doubt, she is 
right: Kashrut and Shabbat are critical, 
distinctive aspects of being Jewish in the 
multicultural world of public school. 
Yet what about the matter of how one 
treats others? Is not that central to being 
Jewish as well? Is not “Thou shalt not 
steal” (a commandment quite relevant 
to young children) among the Ten 
Commandments, along with keeping 
Shabbat? My point is that the girl’s 
questions may reflect a view of Juda-
ism as restricted to ritual Judaism. If 
so, what a loss this is.  If we cannot see 
the sacred in ordinary life, much of our 
vision of the sacred has been lost. 
Separation and the Sacred
I close with four final notes.  
First, affirming the value of the sacred 
in ordinary life — the sacred through 
— is not to denigrate the importance 
of the ritual sacred. Separation — the 
sacred verse — is often sadly neglected. 
The pursuit of the sacred through 
should not come at the expense of the 
sacred vs. Indeed, the two are usu-
ally complementary.  Experiencing the 
sanctity of Shabbat can help us pursue 
sanctity in the other days of the week, 
and vice versa.  At a deep level, the 
dialectical construction of the sacred 
through  vs.the sacred  vs. may blur. 
Second, much of the ritual sacred 
concerns either emotionally powerful 
life-cycle events (such as birth, bar/
bat mitzvah, marriage, divorce and 
death) or emotionally powerful Jewish 
calendar events (such as holidays and 
Shabbat). Further, many but not all of 
these events are uplifting experiences. 
By contrast, the sacred through is often 
much more mundane. It concerns the 
challenges of ordinary life. Life can be 
unpleasant. Life can be boring. The 
sacred through focuses not upon the 
liminal, but upon the typical. Yet that 
is precisely why it is so important.  It is 
The Reconstructionist5  •  Fall 006
easy to sense holiness at the moment of 
a child’s birth.  It is harder when chang-
ing diapers. However, for every one 
birth, there are thousands of diapers to 
change. That is why finding holiness in 
the ordinary is essential.  
Third, let me share a few brief 
thoughts about what one might call 
Jewish “sacred knowledge.” Often, we 
think of Jewish sacred knowledge as 
knowledge about the ritual domains 
of Jewish life — to follow the ques-
tions of the six-year-old, knowledge 
about things like keeping Shabbat 
and kashrut. Yet knowledge about the 
nonritual domains of life — more 
specifically, knowledge about how to 
appreciate and elevate those domains 
— should also be viewed as sacred 
knowledge. Our respect for ritual 
knowledge, in other words, should not 
make us insensitive to the sacred value 
of other life knowledge. Before the func-
tional restriction of Jewish knowledge 
to the ritual realm, such a prioritization 
of ritual knowledge over other sacred 
knowledge made little sense. There 
was no reason to give preference to 
knowledge of the laws of kashrut over 
knowledge of the laws of contracts, since 
both addressed operative law. It is criti-
cal that we respect sacred knowledge in 
both ritual and nonritual areas.  
Fourth and finally, broadening our 
vision of the sacred may help Jews who 
live in a largely secular world have a 
greater sense of religiosity and perhaps 
even integration in their lives. In one 
of his final orations, Moses declares to 
the children of Israel, “This instruction 
(mitzvah) which I enjoin upon you 
this day is not hidden from you, nor 
is it far off. It is not in the heavens (lo 
ba-shamayim hi), that you should say, 
‘Who shall go up for us to heaven, and 
bring it to us, that we may hear it, and 
do it?’ ”(Deuteronomy 30: 11-12)6 
Life of Torah
There are many lessons to be found 
in these lines. The rabbis, of course, 
used this passage as a proof text for 
their power to interpret and determine 
Jewish law, for the Torah was “not in the 
heavens” but here on earth (Babylonian 
Talmud, Bava Metzi’a 59b). Perhaps 
the simplest reading is that of rebuttal: 
Were Jews to assert that they could 
not follow the Jewish law because they 
could not obtain or understand it, such 
a claim would be false. Let me suggest 
a third reading — namely, that a life 
of Torah (and here I mean Torah in 
the broadest sense) can be all-envelop-
ing. It is not “hidden” or “far off,” but 
can guide and infuse life throughout, 
from birth to death, in things large and 
small. To borrow Abimelech’s words to 
Abraham, it is the sense that “God is 
with you in everything that you do” 
(Genesis 21: 22).      
Recognizing Sanctification
With the functional constriction of 
Jewish law to the ritual, it is easy to 
relegate Torah and, with it, our sense 
of sanctification, to the ritual. Such is 
a great loss. Recognizing sanctification 
as not only separation but also elevation 
may help us see the possibility of pursu-
ing sanctification throughout our lives. 
In other words, the legal constriction 
produced by history should not become 
a spiritual one as well.
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1. Kaplan’s usage of “civil law,” which I fol-
low in this essay, is in the civil- vs.-religious 
sense, rather than the civil- vs.-criminal 
sense.
2. I do not here address the question of 
to what extent the lives of Israeli Jews are 
governed by Jewish law. Kaplan’s view was 
that, even within the State of Israel, the ef-
fective scope of Jewish law was quite limited 
through the restriction of rabbinical courts 
to questions of personal status (e.g., mar-
riage, conversion, etc.). See Mordecai M. 
Kaplan, Questions Jews Ask:  Reconstruction-
ist Answers (New York:  Reconstructionist 
Press, 1956; 1972), 323. For secondary 
discussions of Kaplan’s approach to Jewish 
law generally, see Ronald A. Brauner, ed., 
Jewish Civilization:  Essays and Studies:  Jew-
ish Law, Vol.  (Philadelphia: Reconstruc-
tionist Rabbinical College, 1981).  
3. Observe that many of the subjects 
most contested among various branches 
of contemporary American Judaism (e.g., 
patrilineal descent, rabbinical ordination 
of women and gay marriage ceremonies) 
concern matters of ritual law. No great 
internecine battles are being waged over 
criminal penalties, tort damages, evidentiary 
standards and so forth.  
4. In Questions Jews Ask, Kaplan later dis-
cusses this change in less dramatic terms. 
Id. at 323.
5. Consider, for example, the glorious Mish-
naic passage proclaiming the  worth, equality 
and uniqueness of every human life:
father was greater than yours.” . . . 
Also, man [was created singly] to show 
the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed 
be He, for if a man strikes many coins 
from one mold, they all resemble one 
another, but the King of Kings, the 
Holy One, Blessed be He, made each 
man in the image of Adam, and yet 
not one of them resembles his fellow. 
(Sanhedrin 4:5)
This passage is found, quite poignantly, 
as part of the instructions to given to wit-
nesses before testifying in capital cases. 
With the relegation of Jewish law to the 
ritual realm, such a subject is no longer 
strictly “necessary.” Perhaps this passage is 
sufficiently famous that it will not be “lost,” 
but one senses the risk. Many Jewish legal 
texts contain much more than simply law. 
Without the need for the law, such “more” 
may be lost. 
5. The question of what remedy should 
ensue is often far less salient when it comes 
to ritual law. Violations of ritual law may 
roughly be seen as violations between a 
person and God (bein adam l’Makom), 
while the violations of ordinary law are 
typically violations between a person and 
another person (bein adam l’haveiro). 
Though specifying remedies for ritual 
violations is, of course, possible (think 
of Leviticus’ elaborate sacrificial system), 
generally speaking, the remedial focus is 
more immediate and clear for nonritual 
law than for ritual law. For non-ritual trans-
gressions, there is often a present need for 
compensation of the injured party, as well 
as the risk of vigilantism should that need 
not be officially addressed. 
6. Though mitzvah is in the singular, the 
sense in which it is normally understood 
is a broad one, a reading supported by the 
attendant text.  See, e.g., Deuteronomy 29: 
28, 30: 10 and 30: 16.
Therefore was the first man, Adam, 
created alone, to teach us that who-
ever destroys a single life, the Bible 
considers it as if he destroyed an 
entire world. . . . Furthermore, only 
one man, Adam, was created for the 
sake of peace among men, so that 
no one should say to his fellow, “My 
.
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